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Showing 6 of 280 problems in Game theory and mathematical economics
GRAPH-021

Meyniel's Conjecture on the Cop Number

MajorConjecture1985
In the perfect-information game on a finite connected simple graph , the cops choose their starting vertices and the robber then chooses one. The sides alternate, beginning with the cops; on a cops' turn every cop may independently traverse one edge or stay fixed, and on a robber turn the robber may do the same. The cops win when a cop occupies the robber's vertex. If is the minimum number of cops having a winning strategy, then there is an absolute constant such that every -vertex satisfies
OR-002

Strongly polynomial finite Markov decision processes

MajorOpen problemc. 1983
There is a strongly polynomial algorithm which, given a finite state set , finite nonempty action sets , rational transition probabilities , rational rewards , and rational , returns a stationary deterministic policy maximizing
simultaneously for every initial state , using a number of arithmetic operations polynomial only in and maintaining intermediate encoding lengths polynomial in the input length.
TCS-026

Simple Stochastic Games in Polynomial Time

LandmarkOpen problem1992
A simple stochastic game is a finite directed graph whose vertices are partitioned into MAX, MIN, random, and two absorbing sink vertices labeled and . Every nonsink vertex has exactly two outgoing arcs. At a MAX or MIN vertex the corresponding player chooses the next vertex; at a random vertex each outgoing arc is chosen with probability . Starting from a specified vertex , MAX receives payoff exactly when play eventually reaches sink , and payoff otherwise. If
where and range over strategies of MAX and MIN, is there a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm deciding whether ?
GAME-001

Uniform ε\varepsilon-equilibrium in finite multiplayer stochastic games

MajorConjecturec. 1981
Consider any stochastic game with a finite player set , finite state set , finite nonempty action set for each player at state , bounded stage payoff for each action profile , and transition law on . For every and initial state , there exist a behavioral-strategy profile and such that, for every horizon , every player , and every unilateral behavioral deviation ,
where is the state--action process generated by the indicated strategy profile and transition law.